



Version of attached le:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Finlay, Christopher J (2021) 'Deconstructing Nonviolence and the War Machine: Unarmed Coups, Nonviolent
Power, and Armed Resistance.', Ethics and international aairs. .





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
https://dro.dur.ac.uk
Deconstructing Nonviolence and the War Machine  Christopher J Finlay 
 1 
Deconstructing Nonviolence and the War Machine: Unarmed 
Coups, Nonviolent Power, and Armed Resistance 
Christopher J Finlay, Durham University 
Abstract 
Proponents of nonviolent methods often highlight the extent to which they rival arms as effective means of 
resistance. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, for instance, influentially compared civil resistance 
techniques favorably with armed insurrection as means of bringing about progressive political change. Ned 
Dobos cites their work in support of the claim that similar methods—organized in the form of Gene Sharp’s 
idea of ‘civilian-based defense’—may be substituted for regular armed forces in the face of international 
aggression. I deconstruct this line of pacifist thought by arguing that it builds on the wrong binary. Turning 
away from a violence/nonviolence dichotomy structured around harmfulness, I look to Richard B. Gregg 
and Hannah Arendt for an account of nonviolent power defined by not being coercive. Whereas nonviolent 
methods of coercion in the wrong hands still have the potential to subvert democratic institutions—just as 
armed methods can—Gregg’s and Arendt’s conceptions of nonviolent power identify a necessary bulwark 
against both forms of subversion. The effectiveness of non-coercive, nonviolent power is illustrated by the 
resistance of U.S. democratic institutions to largely nonviolent attempts at civil subversion by supporters of 
Donald Trump, during Trump’s attempts to overturn the election in 2020. By contrast, if coercive violence 
had any significance, it is visible not in the riotous behavior of the Trump supporters on January 6, 2021, 
but in the state’s deployment of force—especially the National Guard—to contain the chaotic destruction 
Trump’s supporters threatened. 
Keywords:  Civil resistance; nonviolence; violence; Richard Gregg; Hannah Arendt; coup d’état; United 
States Capitol Attack; jus ante bellum; coercion; harm.  
 
Proponents of civil resistance have long believed that nonviolent methods rival the effectiveness 
of armed force as means of resistance. Among recent contributors, Erica Chenoweth and Maria 
Stephan have, perhaps, been the most prominent.1 Using quantitative methods to compare 
contrasting means of bringing about progressive political change contributes to a powerful 
tradition found, notably, in the ideas and practices of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King 
Jr., and Gene Sharp. In his recent book, Ethics, Security, and the War Machine: The True Cost 
of the Military, Ned Dobos offers a powerful extension of this view through a critique of the 
widespread commitment by states to maintaining established military forces.2 Building on 
Sharp’s idea of  civilian defense systems (CDS), Dobos argues that nonviolent methods offer a 
viable substitute for regular armed forces in the face of international aggression. If CDS are 
potentially as effective as regular armies trained in the use of violence in defending against 
external military threats, then he thinks it undermines the common assumption that democratic 
states need to maintain professional armed forces. In their present form, these forces pose a 
number of dangers. Their training commonly generates a moral code and a culture at odds with 
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the values of civilian life. And it is impossible to eliminate the danger that soldiers will leverage 
their violent skills and equipment to overthrow civilian authorities in a coup d’état. So, if the 
methods of CDS compare favorably to those of armed force in resisting foreign occupiers, then 
democracies ought to consider defunding the army in favor of training their citizens in organized 
nonviolence. This offers strong support for Dobos’s wider claim that ethicists cannot simply 
assume that the armed forces on which just wars rely are legitimate institutions in the first place.  
I offer a twofold critical response to this line of thought. First, I argue that if the civil resistance 
methods associated with CDS really are as effective as their proponents claim, then replacing 
the military with such an institution would mitigate the dangers of military coups d’état. But 
secondly, the same fact should make us more circumspect about nonviolent methods. Organized 
civil resistance can be employed subversively as well as progressively. If it is a powerful tool in 
the hands of democratic egalitarians, then it will be no less powerful in the hands of fascists. 
This is not to say that civil resistance methods cannot be valuable—they certainly can. But at 
least some of the methods used by civil resisters are valuable in a more narrowly instrumental 
way that is akin to the value we place on armed force: both can serve just ends with varying 
degrees of effectiveness; but both are dangerous, morally and politically; and both, therefore, 
ought to be used only for certain ends, under limited conditions, and with due restraint. Dobos 
recognizes that non-violent “weapons” could be subject to “occasional misuse.”3 But I argue 
that their versatility indicates a much deeper problem. 
To make my case, I focus on a pair of dichotomies around which the argument for nonviolent 
civil resistance is constructed. The more fundamental one juxtaposes violence with 
nonviolence. The second builds on this binary, opposing military establishments, their 
equipment, training, methods, and ethos, with the methods, training, and spirit of civil 
resistance and CDS. Turning away from a violence/nonviolence binary structured around 
harmfulness, I draw on Richard B. Gregg and Hannah Arendt for an account of nonviolent 
power defined by non-coerciveness. Whereas nonviolent coercion has the potential in the 
wrong hands to subvert democratic institutions, just as armed methods can, nonviolent power 
is a necessary bulwark against both violent and nonviolent forms of subversion. Rather than 
divesting from armed force or investing in CDS, I therefore think democracies ought to focus 
on sustaining the beliefs and civic virtues that constitute the essential power of political 
institutions. 
Civilian Defense and Civil Resistance 
My first, more superficial argument takes aim at a pair of claims that complement each other in 
Dobos’s argument for substituting CDS for a permanent military. On the one hand, domestic 
military establishments endanger democracies by equipping a subset of their populations with a 
set of hardware, training, and ethos that lends itself to military takeover. This risk of coup d’état, 
combined with what Dobos claims is the potential of CDS to oppose invasion and resist 
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occupation, bolsters the argument that we ought to consider seriously the possibility of 
abandoning arms altogether. Were there no other way to resist foreign aggression than a military 
one, then the coup risk might be worth taking. But if CDS offers a viable alternative, then 
disarmament (or “transarmament” from armed force to civil resistance) is worth considering.4 
Dobos argues from two premises. The first is that we have as much (or nearly as much) reason 
to fear the tyranny of domestic armed forces as we do the tyranny of foreign armed forces. Life 
after a domestic coup d’état more closely resembles the experience of foreign occupation than 
we might think.5 The second premise is that unarmed civil resistance is as effective, or nearly 
so, at resisting foreign invasion forces and occupations as organized, professional armed forces 
are. Based on the second premise, Dobos maintains, we are likely to be as well off employing 
civilian defense as military defense, so far as foreign invasion is concerned.6 And if we add the 
first premise, then we can even argue that we are better off employing civilian defense than 
employing a professional military. This is because harnessing civilian defense against foreign 
invaders, instead of using military force, obviates the risk of coup and domestic armed tyranny. 
I will question the second premise later in this essay. But, for now, my immediate objection to 
Dobos’s argument is that if the methods of civil resistance outlined by Gene Sharp are likely to 
be effective against foreign invaders and occupiers (the greater threat), then presumably they are 
likely to be effective enough to address domestic putschists, too. The availability of civil 
resistance methods means that the vulnerability of civilian populations to their own armies is 
less acute than might at first have appeared, which should reassure those worried by the coup 
risk posed by a professional military establishment. In which case, the argument about the 
potential of CDS to resist military force blunts rather than supports the argument from coup 
d’état.  
But, of course, this objection would not actually defeat Dobos’s argument outright. He only 
suggests that abolishing the military and concentrating instead on building CDS is something 
we ought to consider in light of his premises. And he succeeds in showing that this is a question 
worth asking. However, what the objection does indicate is that a comparison of the respective 
defense systems—military and civil—is likely to indicate less dramatic differences in their 
respective balances of benefits versus risks. In which case, it is less likely that projects for radical 
transformation will be proportionate. To shift from armed to unarmed defense will involve costs 
and risks of its own (including, one would imagine, the risk of triggering a coup). The morally 
relevant differences between the alternative systems need to be large enough to outweigh these 
risks. Whether or not they are large enough depends on detailed estimates and comparisons of 
the salience of different methods and institutions.  
The best arrangements are likely to be those supported by relatively small differences in the 
degrees of effectiveness when we compare alternatives. For instance, if maintaining 
conventional armed forces is generally a little better than civil resistance at warding off foreign 
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invaders but poses a risk of domestic occupation through coup d’état, then the fact that civil 
resistance methods are at least somewhat effective in resisting militaries (whether domestic or 
foreign) might reduce the coup risk enough to make a continued commitment to arms 
worthwhile. 
Nonviolence as Unarmed Force 
There is something more fundamental to say about the juxtaposition of military establishments 
and CDS. This concerns an ambiguity in the underlying dichotomy between the violence of 
the one and the nonviolence of the other. The ambiguity comes into view if we turn to the 
writings of two thinkers whose ideas closely resemble each other in some respects and yet who 
are not often brought into dialogue: Richard Gregg, whose Gandhian tract, The Power of 
Nonviolence, first appeared in 1934, and Hannah Arendt. Dobos contrasts violence and 
nonviolence in one way; Arendt and Gregg contrast them in another. In doing so, Arendt and 
Gregg imply a different binary from Dobos on the basis of which to evaluate various types of 
tactics. Reviewing the practices of civil resistance associated with CDS in light of this rival 
binary indicates a further source of potential danger to democracies, one partially concealed by 
Dobos’s Sharpian analysis.  
Let us assume that we can agree on what violence is. Perhaps, as Iris Marion Young puts it, it 
can be defined as “acts by human beings that aim physically to give pain to, wound, or kill other 
human beings, and/or to damage or destroy animals and things that hold a significant place in 
the lives of people.”7 The question is, what should we understand truly “nonviolent” action to 
be? In Dobos’s account, non-violence appears chiefly in the guise of various kinds of tactics that 
Gene Sharp mapped out for challenging dictators and foreign aggressors. In a CDS, for instance, 
citizens would be trained in “how to organize targeted protests and boycotts, rally support, 
enlist more people to their cause—everything they would need to do to frustrate the ability of 
a foreign aggressor to benefit from his aggression.”8 The moral superiority of these methods to 
violence, Dobos indicates, has to do with harming: the “important difference,” he writes, is 
that, unlike a military establishment, “a CDS would not rely on killing and maiming to achieve 
its objectives.”9  
I wonder, however, whether this really is the most important moral difference. An alternative 
suggestion can be found in Arendt’s On Violence (1969) where she offers her famous twofold 
argument that not only must power and violence be sharply distinguished but also that they are 
opposites. Conceptually, she writes,  
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is 
never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only 
so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is “in power” 
we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their 
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name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with […], 
disappears, “his power” also vanishes.10  
Whereas power, Arendt argues, is an end in itself, violence, “is distinguished by its instrumental 
character. Phenomenologically it is close to strength, since the implements of violence, like all 
other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength.”11 Of course, 
as a form of concerted action, power, too, may be directed instrumentally towards ends. And it 
can also empower some individuals to wield force on behalf of that power, for instance, to 
defend it against external threats. But instrumentality does not define power. Power does not 
come into existence purely to serve ends, even though ends may issue from it and may 
themselves call instruments into being or into service.  
Crucial to Arendt’s differentiation of power from violence is not only instrumentality but also 
coercion. In contrast to speech, by which citizens may interact and conduct their affairs through 
“persuasion,” violence imposes one’s will “through mute coercion.” Coerciveness is what 
makes violence so “disgraceful.”12 As such, it lends itself to those forms of strength that Western 
thinkers have often mistaken for political power.13 Or, to follow Gregg, we might put it more 
pluralistically: By focusing too closely on one form of power—James Tully suggests calling this 
“power-over”—Western political thought has neglected another, perhaps more important form 
of power, “power-with.” In Tully’s paraphrase of Gregg’s Gandhian philosophy, ‘[t]he power 
of non-violence, or satyagraha, is the intersubjective power of interacting “with and for each 
other” in cooperative ways in interdependent relationships with oneself (ethics), other humans, 
all life forms, and the spiritual dimension of existence. It is “power-with”: the type of power 
that animates and sustains all branches of a nonviolent way of life’.14 The opposing practice, 
then, involves coercion and subjection to one’s will: “In contrast, violence and domination are 
the general type of power exercised in violent conflicts and unequal relationships of domination 
and subordination that are imposed and backed up by force, or the threat of force, and various 
types of legitimation. It is “power-over” in its many forms.”15 
So, whereas Dobos contrasts the physical harmfulness of violence with the absence of physical 
harm when using non-violence, Arendt and Gregg juxtapose a practice of violence identified 
closely with wielding coercive power over others with the non-coerciveness of the ‘power-
with’ that arises from acting and interacting with others in cooperation. The significance of this 
alternative distinction becomes clear when we consider the types of action that it excludes from 
the category of non-violence. These will include some of the tactics—and, indeed, the general 
understanding of resistance—promoted by Sharp.  
Gregg has a very specific idea of how the right sort of nonviolent action functions: “we must 
understand one point thoroughly,” he writes: 
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The aim of the nonviolent resister is not to injure, or to crush and humiliate his 
opponent, or to “break his will,” as in a violent fight. The aim is to convert the 
opponent, to change his understanding and his sense of values so that he will join 
wholeheartedly with the resister in seeking a settlement truly amicable and truly 
satisfying to both sides. [...] The function of the nonviolent type of resistance is not to 
harm the opponent nor impose a solution against his will, but to help both parties into 
a more secure, creative, happy, and truthful relationship.16  
This cannot be achieved by any kind of arm-twisting; only persuasion can do it. Compare this 
with Dobos’s characterization of the tactics of moral “Jiu-Jitsu” advocated by Sharp as they 
might be used against a foreign occupier: 
non-violent resistance puts an aggressor in a kind of lose-lose situation. If he tolerates 
the non-cooperation and obstruction of the natives, it effectively means relinquishing 
control of the territory and its people. It probably also means losing the ability to extract 
resources, insofar as this depends on the participation of local labourers, farmers, 
technicians, transport workers, and the like. This would seem to defeat the very purpose 
of the aggression, leaving the occupier with little reason to remain. On the other hand, 
if the aggressor uses violence in an attempt to compel cooperation, this is both expensive 
and liable to backfire in the ways just described, and again the aggressor cedes power. 
[…] If the attacker does not use force he cannot take down the defender. But if the 
attacker does use force, his own momentum is turned against him, he is thrown off 
balance, and again the defender is left standing.17 
Like Gregg, Sharp recognizes that nonviolent action might convert its opponents, but he thinks 
this very rare. Instead, he emphasizes “mechanisms” that can be used to “chang[e] the conflict 
situation and the society so that the opponents simply cannot do as they like.” Centrally, these 
include what he calls “coercion.”18 Coercion encompasses measures by which “the system may 
be paralyzed by resistance” while “noncooperation” is used to prevent a regime from 
performing necessary functions “unless the resisters’ demands are met.”19 
So while Sharp and Gregg both use the term “Jiu-Jitsu,” they use it to refer to quite different 
things. Sharp relishes the potential of an imaginative array of trip wires that can stumble and 
entrap opponents tactically. The opponent’s will is broken once they realize that they will be 
continuously thwarted and that further efforts will be self-defeating. By contrast, Gregg thinks 
that any attempt to gain such an advantage over one’s opponent falls back into the trap of 
domination and, hence, re-enacts the distinctive evil of violence. As Tully puts it, when 
“resisters mobilize ill-will, fear, anger, and enmity, and engage in strategies to gain power over 
violent opponents, then both contestants are playing the same power-over game. It is war by 
other means.”20 Instead, Gregg thinks, the resister ought to seek to change the opponents’ minds 
so that there is no need to coerce them.21 This contrast highlights, as Tully says, “the greatest 
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and most important dis-analogy with jiu-jitsu and all violent methods”: truly nonviolent action 
eschews the coercive power-over entirely that is inseparable from violent methods.  
Arendt’s and Gregg’s reflections call into question the simple violence/nonviolence binary on 
which Sharp’s and Dobos’s analyses are constructed. Let’s say we continue to identify violence 
in the ordinary sense of the word, more or less as Young defines it. We now have two types of 
unarmed action, each distinguished from violence in a different way: on the one hand, there is 
what we can call the unarmed force of Sharp’s jiu-jitsu; on the other, there is the persuasive 
power-with of Gregg’s pure nonviolence: let us call this “nonviolent power.”.22 Instead of one 
dividing line we now have two. Moreover, each construal of the violence/nonviolence binary 
establishes a different moral hierarchy. What distinguishes violence from both unarmed force 
and nonviolent power and renders it morally dubious by comparison is its intentional 
harmfulness. But what distinguishes nonviolent power from both violence and unarmed force 
is the absence of any attempt to use nonviolent power to dominate and coerce.23  
Dobos’s analysis builds on the first binary, contrasting harmfully destructive acts (violence) with 
actions that do not instrumentalize harmful destruction but that at least some of the time coerce 
(unarmed force plus, perhaps, nonviolent power)—tactics (‘non-violent “weapons”’) such as 
boycotts, strikes, ostracizing those who cooperate with the opponent, blockades, and sit-ins.24 
My suggestion, by contrast, is that the second binary is at least as important. Instead of 
emphasizing destructive harming (violence alone), we ought to focus on coercion (not only 
violence but also unarmed force). To see why, we need to turn to the dangers that coercive 
forms of nonviolence can pose. Like organized arms, organized nonviolence, too, can be turned 
to subversive, anti-democratic ends. 
Dangerous Nonviolence 
Dobos’s argument for a Sharpian CDS is not based solely on tactical grounds but also on the 
grounds that it promotes civic virtue. Citizens trained in CDS methods learn new political skills 
and are inspired to effect change through action outside the formal constitutional and 
institutional channels of the state:  
If they previously thought that non-electoral political action couldn’t achieve anything 
tangible, they will have been disabused of this notion. And if they previously lacked the 
practical know-how necessary to effectively take such action themselves, they will have 
gained some valuable experience—and perhaps even a taste for it. […T]hese men and 
women would henceforth be better democratic citizens, in the sense that they would be 
more inclined to participate in politics beyond casting their votes in periodic elections. 
A post-military defence system […] would double as a kind of participatory citizenship 
training.25 
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Characterized in this way, what Sharp and Dobos propose sounds like it could deepen 
nonviolent power in a way that speaks particularly to Arendt’s civic humanist orientation. But 
recent events point toward some dangers, too.  
These come into view if we compare different types of coup d’état. One such possibility is 
exemplified by the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Robert O. Paxton, a 
historian of fascism, thought that Donald Trump’s “open encouragement of civic violence to 
overturn an election crosse[d] a red line” that finally made it “not just acceptable but necessary” 
to describe Trumpism as “fascist.”26 He compared it to similar attempts to thwart the outcome 
of democratic elections by armed force in Europe in the 1930s. Other commentators at the 
time described the riot specifically as an “insurrection” and a “failed coup.”27 But perhaps when 
we picture a coup we might imagine something more orderly than this. More typical is a case 
like Chile in 1973 or Egypt in 2013, in which some of the generals step in to snuff out civilian 
power, arrest civilian leaders, and deploy troops to take control of state media. If Trump was 
engaged in an attempted coup d’état, he acted without this sort of military backing. But there 
is also a third possibility. It is more than imaginable that a coup might occur that chiefly 
employed nonviolent tactics. 
We can see what this would look like by peering behind the growing violence of pro-Trump 
activists early in 2021. The Capitol riot was the final denouement in a longer, sustained attempt 
to mobilize popular and elite resistance to the democratic transfer of power—through 
nonviolent means classically associated with civil resistance. Organizers used social media to 
expand and galvanize support for the defeated incumbent and coordinate action. They deployed 
armies of volunteers to engage in different sorts of protest. Some posted themselves as 
“observers” at election counts, exerting pressure on officials with the ostensible aim of deterring 
anyone from disregarding pro-Republican votes. Others chanted “Stop the count” outside 
voting stations that were likely to contribute to the growing tally of Democrat votes. Various 
kinds of public protest were staged to pressure state officials. Some were more targeted, such as 
those staged at officials’ offices or, as in the case of the Georgia Governor, at their residences. 
Other large, urban protests and rallies demonstrated public dissatisfaction more generally with 
the emerging electoral picture. Protesters’ immediate aims varied, but the overarching political 
strategy seems to have converged in an effort to coerce some officials and representatives and 
embolden others within the U.S. electoral institutions into overturning the election result. 
Protesters hoped that these officials might do so by boycotting or thwarting procedures, for 
instance by refusing to validate electoral counts or by disregarding the state-level results when 
selecting electors to the Electoral College. If enough officials and representatives had been 
cajoled into coordinated action, then their withdrawal of support from legitimate electoral 
procedures—it seems to have been hoped—could have facilitated a bloodless coup (or what 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called “a smooth transition to a second Trump 
administration.”)28  
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Threats of violence often accompanied intimidation tactics, of course—sometimes they were 
implicit, as when protesters openly carried arms, and sometimes explicit, in threatening text and 
voice messages. Such threats fall well outside the Sharp playbook. But many of the tactics 
deployed on behalf of Trump can quite readily be characterized in terms redolent of civil 
resistance and CDS. At the very least, they show how powerful these methods could be if used 
for anti-democratic purposes. And this puts the civic skills they cultivate in quite a different 
light. Trump-supporting citizens, too, put their faith in “non-electoral political action,” hoping 
it could “achieve [something] tangible.” They showed a growing “inclin[ation] to participate 
in politics beyond casting their votes in periodic elections.” And, following the lead of social-
media influencers and networks, they learned how they might “effectively take such action 
themselves, [gaining] some valuable experience—and perhaps even a taste for it.”29  
If Trump’s attempted coup employed some of the methods of non-violent civil resistance, it 
was thwarted by a different kind of non-violent—but also, crucially, non-coercive—action. 
What ultimately defeated the Trumpists was the continued, active power-with invested in 
institutions.30 Even when their sympathies were Republican, most officials, representatives, and 
leaders were too deeply invested in the principles and practices constitutive of the U.S. political 
system to succumb to external pressure. This institutional investment and the coordinated action 
through which it is expressed is precisely what Arendt calls (nonviolent) power. By contrast, if 
coercive violence had any significance in those events, it was chiefly as a means available to the 
state (especially in the form of the National Guard) to contain the chaotic destruction threatened 
by frustrated pro-Trump activists once it had become clear that their attempt at civil subversion 
had failed. 
Conclusion 
Sharp declares that, “[d]ue to their nonviolent nature, the weapons of civilian-based defense 
cannot generally be used for the purposes of repression.”31 This might be true, but it does not 
mean that these weapons cannot be used to bring about more repressive political outcomes. 
What is most threatening to the institutions of democracy is not the ability to inflict violent 
harm as such, but the widespread availability of the means of coercion. And this is precisely 
what the forms of civic action Sharp and Dobos envisage are designed to supply. The ability to 
inflict physical harm can, of course, amplify one’s ability to coerce. But it is not the only means 
of doing so. The aim of CDS is to train citizens in a wide array of different techniques, many 
of which serve the purposes of resistance by coercing opponents. From the point of view of 
Gregg or Arendt, this is little different from training them in the use of arms. 
From an Arendtian theoretical point of view, the sort of power that can truly provide hope of 
withstanding coup risk—whether from the armed forces or from a nonviolent army of CDS 
practitioners—is fundamentally different from the coercive power-over that many nonviolent 
tactics are designed to secure. Unless this power already exists within the institutions of the 
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state, turning to nonviolent means of resistance as an alternative to military force merely trades 
one form of subversion for another.  
The use of coercion does, of course, potentially have a place in democratic political activism. 
In nonviolent forms (and perhaps in some cases even in violent forms) it has played a role in 
the establishment, defense, and deepening of democratic rights and institutions.32 It can also 
help defend democratic power and its institutions from actions aimed at overturning them. But 
like all coercive means, their employment for such purposes must be constrained within an 
ethical framework that carefully defines the appropriate occasions for using them, the limited 
ends for which they might be used, and the restraints that activists must observe when using 
them. In other words, like violence itself, nonviolent methods of coercion need to be 
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